On May 8, 2025, the Alberta Court of King’s Bench handed down a significant decision in Clearview AI Inc v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner). At issue was whether Alberta’s private‐sector privacy law - the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) and its accompanying regulations - unreasonably restricted the use of personal information that is publicly available online, and whether those restrictions violate Canadians’ Charter right to freedom of expression.

What sparked this case?

Clearview AI is a U.S. company that "scrapes" images and associated personal data from publicly accessible online sources (social media, news sites, etc.), converts these into biometric templates, and sells facial‐recognition services - primarily to law enforcement.

In February 2021, Canada’s federal Privacy Commissioner and three provincial counterparts (including Alberta’s) jointly investigated Clearview’s practices, concluding that Clearview needed individuals’ consent under PIPA to collect images and personal information - even if that information was publicly posted online.

Following that Joint Report, Alberta’s Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) issued an order (on December 7, 2021) directing Clearview to:

1. Stop offering facial‐recognition services in Alberta.
2. Cease collecting images and biometric data of Albertans.
3. Delete any images and data already collected.

Clearview challenged the OIPC Order on two main grounds:

• That the OIPC’s interpretation of "publicly available" in PIPA Regulation s. 7 was unreasonable.
• That, in any event, requiring consent to scrape and use publicly available information infringed Clearview’s Charter right to freedom of expression (under s. 2(b) of the Charter).

Was the OIPC’s interpretation of "publicly available" reasonable?

PIPA Regulation s. 7(e) says personal information is "publicly available" when it is "contained in a publication" (e.g. magazine, book, newspaper) that is both publicly accessible and which the individual is assumed to have provided themselves. The Regulation does not mention information available on the internet. Clearview argued that the phrase "including, but not limited to" should extend to any online publication, like social media or websites.

The Court applied the modern standard of judicial review (the Vavilov test) and found the OIPC’s narrow reading - excluding internet sources - was justified. The OIPC’s reasoning, drawn from the Joint Report and correctly adopted, formed a coherent interpretation that did not stray unreasonably from PIPA’s text.

Do restrictions on scraping publicly available data breach freedom of expression?

Next, Clearview argued that scraping publicly available images and information is "expressive activity" protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. After all, that scraped data is the "raw material" for its facial‐recognition service, which conveys meaning to customers (e.g., identifying individuals in images).

The Court agreed that:

• Scraping can be expressive. Collecting and processing images and data facilitates communication of information and meaning through the provision of its service to customers.
• PIPA provisions (ss. 12, 17, 20) and the consent requirement in the PIPA Regulations effectively prohibit Clearview’s expressive activity by making it impractical to secure consent from every person whose image or data appears online.
• Location does not negate protection. Clearview’s bot‐driven activities, even if initiated outside Alberta, involve expressive conduct in Canada to the extent it services customers in Canada.

Thus, the Court found a prima facie infringement of freedom of expression.

4. Was the infringement of Section 2 rights justified under the Charter?

Under the Oakes test, the government must show that a law limiting Charter rights:

1. Pursues a pressing and substantial objective.
2. Is rationally connected to that objective.
3. Impairs rights minimally.
4. Balances benefits and deleterious effects in a proportionate way.

The Court reviewed these factors with the following conclusions:  

Objective. Protecting individuals’ control over their personal information is clearly pressing and substantial.

Rational connection. Requiring consent for use of personal information logically supports that aim.

Minimal impairment + proportionality. Here the Court drew heavily on the fact that PIPA itself contains numerous exceptions to express consent - showing Alberta does not value control over personal information in all circumstances. More importantly, search engines routinely index public information without obtaining individual consent, yet perform vital expressive functions. A blanket consent requirement on all online data‐scraping was overbroad, capturing both harmful and benign expressive activities and resting too much enforcement discretion in the OIPC. Alberta failed to show why a complete prohibition was necessary - especially when it selectively enforced against Clearview and not others.

The Court struck down the limiting words "including, but not limited to, magazines, books and newspapers" from PIPA Regulation s. 7(e), thereby clarifying that "publication" in its ordinary sense includes any information intentionally made public - like posts on social media or websites - and that such information may be used without consent. In striking those words, the Court tailored the law to protect freedom of expression while still allowing regulation of truly private or controlled information.

Why didn’t Clearview win entirely?

Although these constitutional provisions were found overbroad, the Court upheld the OIPC’s Order on a separate ground: reasonableness of purpose under PIPA. PIPA sections 11, 16, and 19 require that any collection, use, or disclosure of personal information be for a "reasonable" purpose - i.e., what a reasonable person would view as appropriate. Clearview’s facial‐recognition services, in the Court’s view, lacked that reasonableness, given the privacy risks, the mass surveillance involved, and the nature of its technology. As a result, Clearview remains compelled to comply with the OPIC's Order, which means Clearview must cease offering all of these facial recognition services to clients in Alberta; cease the collection, use and disclosure of images and biometric facial arrays from individuals in Alberta; and delete its images and biometric facial arrays that have been collected from individuals in Alberta.

Takeaways

• Public vs. private. Information that individuals post online without privacy controls is now squarely "publicly available" under Alberta law - and may be used without consent - so long as the purpose is reasonable.
• Freedom of expression. Automated data‐scraping (by search engines, AI developers, researchers, etc.) can be considered expressive activity, protected by the Charter; overly broad consent rules will face constitutional scrutiny.
• Reasonable purpose still matters. Even public information can only be used for purposes a reasonable person would endorse - Clearview lost on that point.
• Lower‑court decision. This is an Alberta King’s Bench ruling, not yet binding elsewhere in Canada, and it will almost certainly be appealed.
• Legislative response likely. Alberta - and possibly federal and B.C. - privacy statutes may be amended to address this gap. Drafting of any new privacy or AI‐related laws will need to consider this Charter analysis.

Conclusion. The Clearview AI decision is a trailblazer for data‐scraping and AI in Canada. It affirms that people who post information publicly online cannot later insist on consent for every use - but organizations must still have a reasonable purpose. And any law that broadly restricts expressive, bot‑driven data collection may face Charter scrutiny.

For those building AI systems, running search engines, or simply conducting online research, this case underscores both a certain scope of freedom along with an enduring responsibility when handling publicly available personal information.

If your organization is developing AI tools, using facial recognition technology, or relying on data-scraping practices and you need clarity on how Alberta’s privacy laws and Charter rights may apply, please contact Richard Stobbe or any member of Field Law’s Privacy + Data Management or Artificial Intelligence groups.